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Abstract
In 1855, the Ethiopian Empire was (re)established after almost a century of disintegration, 
internal political turmoil and chaos. From 1850s onwards, the Empire witnessed series of 
expansions southwards, westwards, and eastwards until it became what is now Ethiopia. 
The Ethiopian political rule was centered on three main principles: the rule of Solomonic 
dynasty, privileged position of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, and dominance of Amharic 
language and culture.
For any Ethiopian Emperor, it would be unthinkable to be led astray by any oth-
er principles because it would mean treason of for many centuries constructed and repeat-
edly legitimated supremacy of the Solomonic dynasty. Lej Iyasu (1913–1916) belongs to 
the rare examples of the Ethiopian history that, as an Emperor, created an atmosphere 
which today we would call a civil society, social equality, or religious equality. Nevertheless, 
his short-term reign over the vast lands if Ethiopia was filled by an experiment that at least 
symbolically equated Islam with Christianity, and made the Orthodox Church less import-
ant in the eyes of ordinary citizens. As any other major historical event of that time, and 
1)  This study is a part of the internal grant project SGS-2012-07 which the author con-
ducts at the Department of History, Faculty of Arts and Philosophy, University of West 
Bohemia in Pilsen.
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end of the 19th century, newly born capital of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, was a center of 
lively diplomatic meetings and activities of various powers while at the periphery, a 
wide range of missionary activities took place there. All this was happening in the era 
of Menelik’s Ethiopia “expanding its size, centralizing its power, and assimilating the no-
tables of its new subjects” (Tibebu 1995, 49).
Beside the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, Ethiopia gave certain privileges to 
other Christian denominations while Islamic communities formed somewhat of second 
class citizens. In this environment, the enthronement of Lej Iyasu as the Ethiopian Em-
peror in 1913 was a significant change, or transformation of traditional ideology of suc-
cessive Ethiopian Emperors. For being young and rather innovative in this policy, Lej 
Iyasu is usually depicted as “intemperate” (Crummey 2000, 229), his reign as “confused 
and hectic” (Henze 2004, 192). Iyasu’s background helped him in his efforts to guaran-
tee social and religious equality in Ethiopia. His father was a prominent Muslim leader 
of Wällo, Ras Mikael, who was born as Muhammad cAli, a son of Šäwarägga, daughter 
of Menelik II. Born on the day of the Savior of the World (Mädhane Aläm), Iyasu denied 
later accusations of not supporting Christianity by consecrating the Qäččane Mädhane 
Aläm in Addis Ababa (Zewde 2007, 253).
Father of Iyasu, Ras Mikael of Wällo, an ethnic Oromo and Muslim whom 
Yohannes IV converted to Christianity, took control of the town of Dessie in 1880s. The 
strategic importance of Dessie became evident little alter during the war against Italy 
(Pankhurst 1985a, 235–236). Muslims in Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa were marginal 
as compared to the situation of the Sanussis in Libya, etc. The only major effort of the 
Muslims in the Horn came from the British Somaliland, where, under the leadership of 
Sayyid Muhammad Abdullah Hassan, called “Mad Mullah”, the local Somalis successfully 
revolted against the British, though it has to be admitted that for Britain Somali was a 
marginal, unimportant area, where they never wanted to be engaged very much. The 
idea of cooperation of Ethiopia and the Ottoman Empire came from the consul general 
in Harar, Mazhar Bey, who believed in successful military collaboration of both countries. 
In his correspondence with the Sublime Port we can find the origin of Iyyasu’s willingness 
to make a step further to have a harbor:
“The Ethiopians want to have a harbor. If the British are thrown out of Somalia, 
it might work to give Ethiopia part of the coast between Zeila and Bulkar and the territory 
between the coast and the eastern border of Harar. If an agreement is reached with the 
Ethiopians, this need can be covered from this place. The mawla is ready to conquer 
whatever the Sublime Port orders, and his power is enough. He only applied for our help in 
ammunition for next year” (Haggai 1994, 86).
Emperor Menelik II is often said to be a modernizer on the Ethiopian royal 
throne. This cliché is based on several material and technical improvements that he re-
ally initiated including the establishment of the new capital Addis Ababa, military re-
forms, military expansion, and especially his victorious strategy in the battle of Adowa 
especially in Africa, Lej Iyasu was dethroned by an immense international pressure, coming 
from Great Britain, Italy, and France, mixed with internal political and regional rivalries. 
This study reflects the heritage of Lej Iyasu’s reign in Ethiopia and deals with the image he 
has had in Ethiopia’s history. 
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1.	introduction
After 1855, the Ethiopian Empire became a centralized state based on territorial and 
military expansion to peripheries of modern day Ethiopia. Despite these centralizing 
efforts, Ethiopia seemed to be rather disintegrated territory with a number of local 
noblemen claiming power and superiority over the others. Some of them were well 
educated and thus enjoyed a remarkable public prestige, for instance a certain local 
leader named Kasa, the future Emperor Tewodros (Pankhurst 1985a, 126). As Jeśman 
puts it, Ethiopia before Menelik was “hardly anything more than a geographical area, 
a prey of Amhara and Tigréan barons struggling for power, of half-articulate traditi-
ons and of an immensely ancient civilization falling to pieces under the weight of its 
own antiquity” (Jeśman 1958, 97). Traditional Ethiopian historiography analyzed and 
interpreted the Ethiopian history only through lenses of the Solomonic dynasty, usu-
ally avoiding local histories and non-Semitic territories. The Ethiopian Emperors were 
in various contexts described as heroes, idealized for their struggle against both inter-
nal and external enemies. Such depictions may, of course, shift their glamour in the 
course of history, and that is why certain rulers of Ethiopia are now being demytholo-
gized (Sahle 1990).
For Christian Ethiopia (seen from the ruling center) in the last quarter of the 
19th century, the main challenge was represented by European powers, and the so-
called Islamic threat whose major actor was Egypt, followed by the Mahdist Sudan. On 
the other hand, Muslims were an important factor if the international trade in the Horn 
of Africa, and Ethiopia thus had an ambivalent relationship to this religious minority 
(Mengisteab 1990, 369). To face the historical enemy, Ethiopia opened the door for 
European powers, and especially to European missionaries to enter the country to es-
tablish schools, health centers and missions in many parts of the country (Document 
no. 130 and 131, in: Rubenson 2000, 182–186). Especially the great famine of 1892 re-
sulted in massive conversions to Catholicism and Protestantism, because people in the 
countryside gained help and support from European missionaries (Pankhurst 1985b, 
108). European powers competing for the influence in Ethiopia were Italy, France, and 
Great Britain, but several other countries used its representatives to develop and 
strengthen contacts with Ethiopian Imperial court. These were countries like Sweden, 
Belgium, or Germany, but perhaps surprisingly significant role was played by Russia, a 
major diplomatic enemy of Italy in the Horn of Africa (Jeśman 1958, 99). Already at the 
128	|	129
Ethiopia. Itege Taytu and her daughter Zäwditu represented the traditionalist wing 
within the Ethiopian politics, and Iyasu’s visions of religious equality were seen by them 
as heresy.
His short-term reign was according to many historians characterized by 
contradiction and inconsistency (Zewde 2001, 121–128) when he undertook several 
campaigns against southern Ethiopia resulting in enslavement of dozens of thousands 
individuals, or when he expressed his support to Sayyid Muhammad Abdille Hassan, 
the Somali leader successfully fighting against the British in the British Somaliland. 
After the beginning of World War I, Iyasu extended his relations with Germany and 
Turkey – in order not to be strictly dependent on France, Britain and Italy – which was 
a process that had begun already during the Menelik’s rule (Scholer 1980). Iyasu’s also 
extended his friendly and strategic relations with various local leaders in Ethiopia, the 
way how to fulfill this demanding task led through marriages with daughters of 
important noblemen in Muslim and Oromo areas (Zewde 2007, 255–256). This was a 
strategy that various of his predecessors used as well. On the other hand, what he 
lacked, was a strong tie to the most important region of Shäwa, Menelik’s domain, 
from which most of the Amhara nobility and ministers came. Especially after the 
death of Ras Täsämma, Iyasu lost any direct contact with the Shäwan politics, and 
local aristocracy was not willing to support him because of losing their own status and 
privileges (Barnes 2001, 108). 
3.	Lej	iyasu	and	the	“wind	of	change”?
The official Ethiopian historiography, as was established during the Haile Selassie peri-
od, portrayed Lej Iyasu as almost a traitor to the Solomonic dynasty and the Empire. 
Recent historical findings and research have shown a little different view on Lej Iyasu. 
Several recent authors including Cecil Barnes, Harold Marcus or Bahru Zewde have 
started the process of rehabilitation of Iyasu which has become a difficult task after 
such long period of time in which Iyasu gained negative image and is surrounded by 
many stereotypes. During and after his reign, the image of Lej Iyasu as an enemy of 
Ethiopian Christians was created and many scholars then accepted this vision without 
any deeper analysis. Of course, Lej Iyasu, more than any other Emperor before or after 
him favored Islam, but we have to see also his pragmatical reasons to do so, though it 
is easy to admit that Lej Iyasu remains one of the most controversial persons in the 
modern history of Ethiopia. A critical study to explain and describe the era of Lej Iyasu-
’s reign still remains to be done. One such a cliché can be found in the work of a man 
who on the other hand presented a “symbol of independence”, Haile Selassie, who gi-
ves us ten proofs of Iyasu’s conversion to Islam:
“1) He married four wives claiming: ‘the Qur’an permits it to me.’[…]
(2) He built a mosque at Jijjiga with government funds and gave it to Muslims.
(3) At the time he sent to Mahazar Bey […] our Ethiopian flag […] on which he had caused to 
which guaranteed him an image of immortal Emperor for many Ethiopians (Rubenson 
1964). Probably the main feature of the end of the 19th century in Ethiopia was Mene-
lik’s reliance on foreign advisors and engineers. The most prominent was a Swiss engi-
neer Alfred Ilg who was asked to build a modern capital (see Pankhurst 1961). Despite 
all these efforts, I argue that it was Lej Iyasu, Menelik’s successor on the throne who can 
be, in a certain sense and through contemporary lenses be regarded as a modernizer, in 
terms of social and religious reforms, or at least attempts leading to creation of equal 
society where exist nothing like a “second class citizen”. 
2.	Lej	iyasu	and	Menelik’s	legacy
Lej Iyasu had an uneasy task, to replace Menelik II (1889–1913) who not only defeated 
the Italian forces at the battle of Adowa, but was very much devoted to the expansio-
nist policy of his predecessors. Moreover, Menelik was truly respected leader whose 
later career was disrupted by a severe disease. Last five years of his reign were charac-
terized by latent internal clashes between various kin groups and political circles. Euro-
pean powers were constantly strengthening their influence on Ethiopia, mainly in the 
economic sector, and the Orthodox Church was very much supportive of Menelik’s 
daughter, princess Zäwditu. Two frontiers had to be taken care of, the international, 
and the internal.
Moreover, the Ethiopian economy during and after Menilek’s rule was 
strongly influenced by its close relation to Italy, France and Great Britain. According to 
several treaties on financial and economic help leading to creation of the National Bank 
of Abyssinia in 1905, several foreign banks were interested in its initiation. Ethiopia’s 
relations with Europe were based on a number of treaties defining their mutual borders 
and affairs. The treaties signed on October 28, 1902, between Great Britain and 
Ethiopia, and between Great Britain, Italy and Ethiopia define borders between Ethiopia 
and the neighboring European colonies (MAT 1967, 431–436). The agreement between 
Great Britain, France and Italy signed on December 13, 1906 (the so-called Tripartite 
Treaty), defined European strategy and policy in Ethiopia. Article 3 of the Treaty 
presumed non-interventionist policy of the European powers in the case of possible 
internal changes in Ethiopia (MAT 1967, 436).
With the death of Menelik in 1913, the throne was open to Lej Iyasu, whose 
time in power brought various challenges to the Orthodox Church and the foreign 
powers. Iyasu’s enthronement was not a surprise, because already in 1909, Menelik 
officially designated Iyasu heir to the throne. When Iyasu got twelve years old, Ras 
Täsämma Nadäw became his regent. Iyasu’s succession was largely disputed by Itege 
Taytu, wife of Menelik II, who had her own plans with the throne, and counted with her 
daughter Zäwditu and her husband Dädžazmačč Gugsa Wale as the future rulers of 
Ethiopia (Zewde 2007, 254). Things got worse when it became clear that Iyasu’s 
sympathies belonged to Ethiopian Muslims, so far rather neglected community in 
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all the negative stereotypes, Musil was very much aware of the European interests 
and European propaganda led against the young Emperor.2 Alois Musil assumed, 
unlike many of his contemporaries, that the European powers relied on civil war in 
politically disintegrated country which would then result in an easy colonization done 
by Italy and Great Britain. Moreover, Musil aptly depicted backstage clashes between 
the Empress Taitu and Ras Tafari when he stated that Zewditu thought “Tafari was too 
progressive, that he disrespected the inherited order, yearned for novelties, which would 
harm the faith and manners” (Musil 1934, 87). Probably the most positive picture 
about Lej Iyasu was presented by his chronicler Gebre-Igziabiher Elyas (see Elyas and 
Molvaer 1994) whose account on Lej Iyasu has led some authors to rehabilitation of 
Iyasu’s role in Ethiopian history.
The most probable reason why Iyasu’s image was so negatively portrayed 
throughout the 20th century, is the fact that he was not fully part of the Shawan estab-
lishment, which was the crucial factor in power relations inside Ethiopia. Iyasu, as a son 
of Ras Miakel of Wallo, a Muslim Oromo who later converted to Christianity, and mar-
ried the daughter of Menelik, was weakened by regional governors and the Council of 
Ministers, created by Menelik, and by its origin. His reign was thus characterized by the 
everlasting struggle between the center and the periphery where he intended to gain 
support from local Muslims by making them equal to Christians (Abebe 1998, 149–151).
Although there had been correspondence and at least an “ideological” 
concordance between Ethiopia and the Ottoman Empire, a visible action was missing. At 
the end of 1915, Mazhar tried to push things forward by corresponding to the Sublime 
Port but the answer came half a year later, including a decision of Enver Pasha: 
“We are following with interest your relations with mawla of Somalia. It is 
understood that he is ready for every action under Ottoman supremacy. A guarantee can be 
given that in case he conquers any place from the Italians or the British, that place will be 
given to him. The Ottomans and their allies are defeating their enemies and shall win […]
If Ethiopia takes action against our common enemy as we hope, you have the 
permission to say that whatever they capture from Britain, Italy or France, we will support the 
Ethiopians so that they will keep these territories even in peacetime. [These territories] were 
captured [by the British, Italians, and the French] from the Ottomans in older times. We will 
2)  “By virtue of wanting to know his Empire and its peoples and to integrate its groups 
tightly together and to the center of Addis Ababa, Iyasu visited all regions, mainly border 
ones. He was two times in the French Djibouti, accompanied by Tafari, governor of Harar. 
French officers and officials who met him were very much excited about him. The senior 
capuchin missionary who stayed with him frequently, praised him during his visit to Italy 
and France at the beginning of 1916” (Musil 1934, 83).
be written the following words (in Arabic): ‘There is no god but Allah and Muhammad is the 
messenger of Allah.’
(4) He wore Somali Muslim clothes and the Muslim turban, held the Islamic rosary, and was 
seen to prostrate himself in the mosque. 
(5) He was seen praying and reading the Qur’an having had it transcribed in Amharic 
characters.
(6) On the headgar of his special guards he had embroidered the legend ‘there is no other 
god but Allah’.
(7) H. H. Ras Makonnen had built a church at Harar and had made the area adjoining the 
church into a dwelling for the clergy; giving the Muslims a place in exchange; then, 32 years 
later, he (Ledj Iyasu) expelled the clergy and restored it to the Muslims.
(8) When a girl was born to him he saw to it that she would grow up learning the Muslim reli-
gion, and he gave her to the Muslim Madame Hanafi and said: ‘Bring her up on my behalf.’
(9) He despised the descent of Menilek II, which comes direct from Menilek I, and claimed to 
be descended from the Prophet Muhammad; assembling the great Muslim sheikhs, he 
spent the day convincing them of his genealogical calculations.
(10) The day on which our great king, Emperor Menilek […] died, instead of mourning and of 
arranging lamentations, he went out horse-riding to Jan-Meda and spent the day playing 
combat-games” (Haile Selassie I 1976: 48–49).
Bahru Zewde, a prominent Ethiopia historian, states that Iyasu’s intention 
was not to disestablish Orthodox Christianity in favor of Islam. Moreover, he argues 
that his policy was based on the idea to “redress the injustices of the past”, and to make 
“Muslims feel at home in their own country” (Zewde 2001, 124). Harold Marcus explains 
some of concrete steps undertaken in order to emancipate local Muslims. He inaugu-
rated a program of taxing Christian gentry in Harar and Dire Dawa and made some 
Muslim foreigner a nägädräs who superintended customs and markets in both towns 
which was seen by Ras Tafari as treason to the Christian dominance. Lej Iyasu’s desire 
was to “reduce tyranny under which Muslims lived and to lessen the exploitation they suf-
fered. He wanted to transform himself into a more national and neutral figure, not flexibly 
identified with the Christian ruling caste” (Marcus 1998, 15).
Recently, Frederic Sharf edited “lost” letters and notes written by a military 
officer Hugh Drummond Pearson during the reign of Lej Iyasu, which, interestingly, 
show Iyasu’s efforts to keep integrity of Ethiopia and to protect Ethiopia’s interests 
against the interests of foreign powers. Great Britain was very much interested in vari-
ous projects regarding the Lake Tana water schemes, and generally, the control over the 
Nile waters. From the correspondence and other archival sources it is obvious that Lej 
Iyasu and the nobility in general feared of losing control and sovereignty after signing a 
treaty with Great Britain (Pearson 2004, 32).
The Czech Arabist and writer Alois Musil had enough understanding for the 
young Lej Iyasu. While many other sources presented Iyasu as incompetent and repeat 
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embargo, it was the Paris government who initiated the question of Ethiopia’s possible 
membership in the League of Nations. As a signatory power, Ethiopia could obtain as 
many arms as needed. The British position was motivated in the economic sphere as 
well, when the British sought to build the Lake Tana Dam for the Gezira region irrigati-
on, but with the embargo on arms sales to Ethiopia it looked complicated to realize 
these plans. After a series of discussion, being aware of broader economic aspects, Ita-
lians finally conceded that it would be worthy to support Ethiopia’s admission to the 
League (see e.g. Hess 1963 or Marcus 1983).
The three European powers maintained their policy towards Ethiopia 
insisting on continuity of the Ethiopian independence. In a dispatch sent to Addis Ababa 
on August 4, 1917, by a French representative, France promises to send 30,000 guns and 
6 million cartridges. The three powers pledged not to cease any part along the Ethiopian 
frontier to Germany, Austria or Turkey after the war (Labrousse 1980, 283–284). The 
Agreement can be seen as a direct response to the previous period of the reign of Lej 
Iyyasu, whose contacts with Germany and Turkey were for the Three Powers and the 
Ethiopian Orthodox Church unacceptable. Contacts with Germany occurred in various 
ways, resulting in military programs of different types, and with strategic aims, as 
suggested by Scholler (1980).
World War I did not mean a change in Italian policy toward the Horn of Africa. 
The Treaty of London of April 26, 1915, and its Article 13 granted Italy territorial gains 
in Libya, Eritrea and Somaliland if England and France enlarge their colonies by 
absorption of the German territories (Podestà 2004, 138–139). After the World War, the 
Allied Powers were not motivated to allow Italy to enlarge its colonial domains. Partly, 
it was because their own interests and unwillingness to share the potential prize with a 
rival. The other, and more serious reason originated in Italy’s ambiguous attitude during 
the war, especially its failure to declare war on Germany until August 28, 1916, had done 
much to weaken its position. Italy thus failed to obtain from France and Britain their Red 
Sea colonies. Both powers also did not allow it to abandon the guaranteed independence 
of Ethiopia (Hess 1963, 126).
Italy hoped for gaining huge benefits after the end of World War I in exchange 
for entering the war. The most important part for Italy was Article 13 of the Treaty of 
London signed on April 26, 1915. Italy would receive extensions of its territory in Libya, 
Eritrea and Somaliland if England and France should enlarge their colonial empires by 
absorption of the German colonies. Italian interests in Ethiopia after the battle of Adowa 
and the Tripartite Treaty of 1906 were renewed in 1913 and 1914, when the Director-
General of Political Affairs in the Ministry of Colonies, Giacomo Agnesa, met the British 
Ambasador Sir James Rennell Rodd within several talks. On the background of the 
Tripartite Treaty, Italy sought to determine more precisely its interests in East Africa.
The main Italian concern in this early phase was to achieve the possession of 
Kismayu in Southern Somalia. After entering World War I, the discussion of further 
support them [the Ethiopians] even in peacetime to keep their conquests. This suits the 
Ottoman interest too” (Haggai 1994, 87–88).
Finally, no direct action happened because of the incompatible interest of 
both sides underlined in the previous letter. While the Ottomans supported Mad Mul-
lah, or mawla, to create an autonomy in the Horn, Lej Iyasu wanted to see Somalia’s 
autonomy within a new Ethiopian configuration. The entrance of Ethiopia into the War 
remained only a dream written in correspondence. Iyasu’s secret talks and letters with 
the leaders of the Central Powers were revealed in 1916 and since this time a remark-
able press on his resignation started. His close contacts with the Ottoman Consul-Gen-
eral and Istanbul led to his portray of Turcophile and Germanophile, but the most im-
portant challenge to the European powers was his support of Muhammad Abdallah 
Hassan in the British Somaliland, which was seen by the British as something unac-
ceptable (Zewde 2007, 255).
When Iyasu was on his visit to Harärge, he was publicly charged for antago-
nizing the country’s powerful neighbors and disrespecting former Emperor Menelik and 
his legacy. The deposition of Lej Iyasu took place in an atmosphere of widespread mobi-
lization of military forced who were at every corner of Ethiopia instructed to hunt him 
down. In some places, riots occurred because of no control from the center (Garretson 
2002, 204). History is written by winners, not losers, and in this manner, Ras Täfäri 
Mäkonnen, the future Haile Selassie, presented himself in the 1910s and 1920s “as a 
champion of change and reform” (Crummey 2000, 230). The name of Iyasu became 
somewhat forgotten and the Ethiopian historiography very often depicts him as a trai-
tor or at least strange ruler (Reta 2007, 262–269). Lij Iyasu’s name is now being revoked 
by certain historians. What is quite interesting is Lej Iyasu’s pro-Islamic feeling and his 
ethnic origin. His father, Ras Mikael of Wällo was an Oromo, and at the same time an 
important provincial nobleman. For Oromo scholars and nationalists, Lej Iyasu would 
be a perfect example of importance of both Oromo and Muslim identity in the modern 
history of Ethiopia (Schlee 2003, 355), but this debate exceed the scope of this article. 
4.	World	War	i	and	the	Foreign	interests
The Allies sent a note to the Ethiopian government in 1916, protesting against Iyasu’s 
policy. On September 27, Iyasu was deposed and Menelik’s daughter Zäwditu was desig-
nated heir to the throne. Iyasu fled to the Afar region where he became a fugitive for the 
following five years (see e.g. Haile Selassie I 1976, Zewde 2007). On September 12, 1916, 
the Tripartite Powers explained their action in a joint note regarding Lej Iyasu’s mislea-
ding behavior towards the Allies on the side of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey. 
The French, striving for having sufficiently established a colony in Djibouti continuously 
maneuvered to provide guns and ammunition to Ethiopia, though it was Italy and Britain 
who successfully blocked the arms deliveries (Marcus 1983). Since France was willing to 
increase its economic incomes from the trade with Ethiopia with an effort to break the 
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historiography tend to rehabilitate his image and contribution to the history of Ethiopia. 
Recent findings and interpretations have shown his “modern” face which was continu-
ously undermined by traditionalists and “loyal” governors, and by international context 
including the World War I. Despite all these factors, Iyasu can be taken as an example of 
a modern ruler who was standing against injustice, inequality, and traditions. Only his 
short-lived rule and later destiny made him rather forgotten in the history of Ethiopia.
After the deposition of Lej Iyasu, Ethiopia turned with Queen Zewditu and 
the heir to the throne, Ras Tafari, to the continuity of foreign policy directed primarily to 
Great Britain, France, and Italy. Unlike Ethiopia, the Muslim world has undergone a 
remarkable, almost fundamental change after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, when the 
last all-embracing empire in the world of Prophet Muhammad went to an end. New 
states have been created, new governments with new policies, European powers sought 
to strengthen their influence in the new areas, and new relations with Christian Ethiopia 
had to be established. If World War I was a period of growing contacts between the 
Muslim world and Ethiopia, the 1920’s showed only a limited interest of Islamic countries 
in the Middle East to increase relations with Ethiopia. People in the newly independent 
countries from Syria, Lebanon, and Transjordan to Iraq had to deal with their own daily 
problems and had to struggle for their new independence. Finding a new integrity and 
identity was the major task, and Ethiopia in this sense played only a marginal role. 
Haile Selassie’s approach to Islam was reflected in the constitution of 1931 
which established equal rights for all Ethiopians. However, this does not mean that Islam 
was given the same value in the sense of historical memory and legacy, and this can be 
well documented also on the example of Haile Selassie’s own words when he blamed 
Iyyasu for converting to Islam, which means betraying the tradition of a Christian ruler.
References
ABEBE, Berhanou (1998): Histoire de l’Éthiopie d’Axoum à la révolution. Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose. 
BARNES, Cecil (2001): Provinces and Princes: Power and the Eastern Ethiopian Periphery, 1906–1916. 
Journal of Ethiopian Studies, Vol. 34, No. 2, pp. 95–120.
CRUMMEY, Donald (2000): Land and Society in the Christian Kingdom of Ethiopia. From the Thirteenth to the 
Twentieth Century. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press. 
ELYAS, Gebre-Igziabiher a Molvaer, Reidulf K. (1994): Prowess, Piety and Politics. The Chronicle of Abeto 
Iyasu and Empress Zewditu of Ethiopia (1909–1930). Köln: Rüdiger Köppe Verlag.
GARRETSON, Peter P. (2002): Vicious cycles: ivory, slaves, and arms on the new Maji frontier. In: Donham, 
Donald and James, Wendy (eds.): The Southern Marches of Imperial Ethiopia. Essays in History and Social 
Anthropology. Oxford: James Currey, pp. 196–218. 
HAGGAI, Erlich (1994): Ethiopia and the Middle East. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 
Haile Sellassie I (1976): My Life and Ethiopia’s Progress, 1892–1937 (transl. and ed. by Edward Ullendorff). 
London: Oxford University Press.
HENZE, Paul B. (2004): Layers of Time. A History of Ethiopia. Addis Ababa: Shama Books. 
HESS, Robert L. (1963): Italian Colonialism in Somalia. Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
JEŚMAN, Czesław (1958): The Russians in Ethiopia. An Essay of Futility. London: Chatto and Windus. 
LABROUSSE, Henri (1980): L’Ethiopie et le traite de Versailles. In: Tubiana, Joseph (ed.): Modern Ethiopia. 
From the Accession of Menelik II to the Present. Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference of Ethiopian 
Studies. Valbonne, pp. 283–299.
MARCUS, Harold G. (1983): The Embargo on Arms Sales to Ethiopia, 1916–1930. The International Journal 
of African Historical Studies, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 263–279.
MARCUS, Harold G. (1998): Haile Selassie I: The Formative Years 1892–1936. Lawrenceville: Red Sea Press.
colonial settlement increased as the minimum and maximum programs were put in by 
the Colonial Ministry demanding the abrogation of the Tripartite Treaty. Besides the 
demands on control of the Red Sea and extension of Italy’s colonial territory, Rome 
often repeated that Italy “was certainly not pushed into this war by imperialist goals, but 
only by the task of completing her national unity” (Hess 1963, 115).
As the post-war discussion was nearing its end, Italy was aware of its 
disadvantaged position, as documented by Minister Colosimo’s condemnation: “What 
is taking place in Ethiopia is unique. A representative of an associated Power and a 
representative of an allied Power which signed a special accord for Ethiopia with us are 
inciting Ethiopian public opinion against Italy, making a peaceful discussion of the Italian 
programme at the Peace Conference impossible […] What idea can the Ethiopian 
Government have of the solidarity of the Allied and Associated Powers when they see 
France and America behaving in Ethiopia as enemies of Italy […]” (Hess 1963, 122).
The Italian embitterment after the Versailles Conference can be best 
illustrated on the example of a telegraph sent by Colosimo to Orlando, whose words 
coincide with statements of Fascist leaders from the 1920’s claiming the Italian right for 
colonial expansion, which had been forbidden by the Peace Conference. After the third 
meeting of the Committee on Article 13 on May 2, 1919, Colosimo wrote the following: 
“It appears that there is nothing more to hope for, except the rectification of the borders in 
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of the highest importance to Italy, is about to resolve itself in betrayal” (Hess 1963, 125). 
From many other statements in the pre-Fascist and then the Fascist era, it is clear that 
despite those declarations claiming almost absence of any colonial ambitions at 
entering the war, the results of the post-war processes became a bitter end since in the 
era of colonialism, what else could have a country like Italy demand as a reward?
If the main scope of this work is to examine the uneven position of Ethiopia 
within international affairs, one of the aspects, largely extravagating the narrow Italian-
Ethiopian case, was the embargo on arms sales to Ethiopia from 1916 to 1930 that put 
Ethiopians into an uneven role among the sovereign states since Ethiopia had no military 
industry of its own and could have been handicapped within possible military affairs in 
the Horn. Italy, after its defeat at Adowa, and with its uncertain position among the 
Allies during World War I, felt that Ethiopia would be a better neighbor without a huge 
military arsenal (see Hess 1963). 
5.	Conclusion
Lej Iyasu, as we have seen, belongs to the less remembered but very important rulers 
in modern history of Ethiopia. Even though modern historiography portrayed him usu-
ally as a traitor to the Solomonic dynasty and Christian heritage, recent authors and 
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Abstract 
Although F. P. Ramsey (1903–1930) died aged nearly 27, he managed to publish a few 
pioneering works in mathematics, logic and philosophy. But this article deals with his work 
in the field of general economic theory only. We can identify four topics in his three eco-
nomic contributions. By all means these four Ramsey´s topics were ahead of his time, and 
have influenced the economics decades later. Ramsey´s first article contributes to the 
expected utility theory, in other words the decision problem under uncertainty. The second 
one contributes to the taxes theory and monetary policy theory. In the third one he built a 
new and unique methodological approach to economic modelling, which is the aim of this 
article. So called Ramsey´s model lies traditionally within the field of economic growth but 
under some modifications also within the field of public finance, supply-side economics and 
new classical macroeconomics. Ramsey´s model is the main ingredient of contemporary 
analysis of short- and long-run effects of macroeconomic stabilization policy. 
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